September 23, 2002

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609

Re: Regulation Analyst Certification (File No. S7-30-02)

Dear Mr. Katz:

The Investment Company Institute\(^1\) appreciates the opportunity to comment on proposed Regulation Analyst Certification ("Regulation AC") to address conflicts of interest faced by research analysts and their firms.\(^2\) Our comments are limited to the effect of this proposal on investment advisory personnel.

Proposed Regulation AC sets forth an approach similar to that taken by the NASD and NYSE in their recently adopted rule changes relating to analyst conflicts of interest.\(^3\) In particular, the Proposing Release notes that the term "research analyst" would not include an investment adviser, such as a mutual fund portfolio manager, who is not principally responsible for preparing research reports, even if the investment adviser is a registered person of a member.\(^4\)

The Institute supports the approach taken in proposed Regulation AC. As we stated in our previous comment letters on the NASD and NYSE proposals in this area,\(^5\) whatever potential conflicts of interest may exist in the context of statements made by investment advisory personnel, such as portfolio managers of mutual funds and other discretionary accounts, they are greatly attenuated as compared to those presented by "sellside" analyst recommendations. Moreover, advisory firms already have stringent procedures in place to address potential conflicts, such as those relating to the personal investment activities of portfolio managers. For these reasons, we believe it is appropriate for the Commission to exclude investment advisory personnel from the

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\(^1\) The Investment Company Institute is the national association of the American investment company industry. Its membership includes 8,973 open-end investment companies ("mutual funds"), 514 closed-end investment companies and 6 sponsors of unit investment trusts. Its mutual fund members have assets of about $6.363 trillion, accounting for approximately 95% of total industry assets, and over 87.8 million individual shareholders.


\(^4\) Proposing Release, note 16.

\(^5\) Letter from Amy B.R. Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Barbara Z. Sweeney, NASD Regulation, dated August 15, 2001 (NASD proposal to amend NASD Rule 2210) and letter from Amy B.R. Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, dated April 18, 2002 (proposed NASD and NYSE conflict of interest rule changes). Copies of these comment letters are attached.
scope of Regulation AC. Accordingly, we also would oppose, in response to the request for comment in the Proposing Release, broadening the definitions of “research report” and “research analyst” in a way that would sweep investment advisory personnel into the scope of the proposal.

The Proposing Release requests comment on whether there are certain classes of persons associated with a broker-dealer that should not be subject to proposed Regulation AC and whether the rule should explicitly exclude investment advisers. Because “any person associated with a broker-dealer” would include “any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with such broker-dealer,” the proposal could be read to apply to certain investment advisers. The Institute therefore supports an explicit exclusion of investment advisers to make clear that they are not covered by the rule.

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We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposal. If you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact the undersigned at 202-326-5824 or Ari Burstein at 202-371-5408.

Sincerely,

Amy B.R. Lancellotta
Senior Counsel

Attachments

cc: Annette L. Nazareth, Director
    Robert L.D. Colby, Deputy Director
    James A. Brigagliano, Assistant Director
    Division of Market Regulation

    Paul F. Roye, Director
    Robert E. Plaze, Associate Director
    Division of Investment Management

    Securities and Exchange Commission

* Although we do not believe that there is any need, for the reasons stated above, to apply Regulation AC to investment advisory personnel, should the Commission wish to consider this matter further, we believe it should do so only in the context of a tailored rule proposal under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and/or the Investment Company Act of 1940, rather than as part of an initiative designed for broker-dealer personnel.

7 Section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
August 15, 2001

Ms. Barbara Z. Sweeney
Office of the Corporate Secretary
NASDAQ Regulation, Inc.
1735 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006-1500

Re: NASD Notice to Members 01-45 (Required Disclosures for Securities Recommendations)

Dear Ms. Sweeney:

The Investment Company Institute\(^1\) appreciates the opportunity to comment on NASD Regulation’s request for comment on proposed amendments to NASD Rule 2210, Communications with the Public.\(^2\) Most of our comments are limited to the effect of the proposal on investment advisory personnel, in particular portfolio managers of mutual funds and other discretionary accounts.\(^3\) In addition, we have several comments regarding the use and scope of the term “recommendation.” Finally, we request clarification on certain other matters relating to the scope of the proposal.

I. Application of Proposal to Investment Advisory Personnel

NASDR’s proposal would impose new disclosure requirements upon NASD members and their associated persons in an effort to address the potential conflicts of interest presented by analyst recommendations. These disclosure requirements also would apply to “portfolio managers of investment companies and other discretionary accounts ... where these managers are also associated persons of an NASD member.”\(^4\) The Institute strongly opposes the application of the proposed rule change to such portfolio managers.

\(^1\) The Investment Company Institute is the national association of the American investment company industry. Its membership includes 8,598 open-end investment companies (“mutual funds”), 504 closed-end investment companies and 7 sponsors of unit investment trusts. Its mutual fund members have assets of about $6.991 trillion, accounting for approximately 95% of total industry assets, and over 83.5 million individual shareholders.

\(^2\) NASD Notice to Members 01-45 (July 2001) (“Notice”).

\(^3\) For the sake of simplicity, and to track the language of the proposal as noted below, references in our letter to the term “portfolio manager” also include any other investment advisory personnel that would be subject to the proposal.

\(^4\) Notice at Endnote 1.
First, as a general matter, we believe the proper context for any new requirements on portfolio managers is rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and/or the Investment Company Act of 1940. If portfolio managers, when discussing securities during a public appearance, are not providing disclosures necessary to alert investors of potential conflicts of interest, this raises issues under those statutes. The fact that such individuals may also happen to be associated with an NASD member is simply irrelevant. Indeed, it would be odd for there to be different standards for portfolio managers depending on whether or not they are associated with a broker-dealer.5

In addition, the proposal does not consider the differences in the potential conflicts of interest presented by "sellside" analyst recommendations and statements made by portfolio managers.6 As such, the proposal fails to recognize that, at least in the great majority of cases, any potential conflicts of interest for portfolio managers would be greatly attenuated. For example, mutual fund portfolios are generally comprised of a relatively large number of securities. It is therefore difficult to see how a portfolio manager discussing a security held in a fund’s portfolio during a public appearance would have a significant impact on the performance of the fund. In addition, in such a case, it is less likely that a conflict of interest would arise as the portfolio manager, by previously purchasing the security and presently holding the security in his fund, presumably must truly believe that the recommended security is a "good buy."

NASDR also failed to take into account the fact that advisory firms already have stringent procedures in place to address potential conflicts relating to the personal investment activities of investment advisory personnel, including portfolio managers. Most mutual funds, for example, have procedures that require investment personnel to pre-clear personal securities transactions. In addition, the Institute, in its Report of the Advisory Group on Personal Investing;7 recommended, among other things, that mutual funds institute blackout periods, which prohibit a portfolio manager from buying or selling a security within at least seven calendar days before and after an investment company that he manages trades in that security. The Report also recommended a ban on short-term trading profits. Substantially all fund groups have adopted the Institute’s recommendations. In addition to these voluntary measures, funds must adhere to federal securities law requirements, particularly Rule 17j-1 under the Investment

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5 It is important to note that, in most instances, the only reason portfolio managers register with the NASD, and therefore become an associated person of a broker-dealer, is not to sell individual securities but rather to participate in fund marketing activities (e.g., when a portfolio manager goes on a “road show” to promote a new fund, his activities may trigger NASD registration requirements). It also should be noted that the NASD member of which these individuals would be associated persons would be the fund’s distributor, which, in most cases and unlike a traditional broker-dealer, does not conduct any transactions in individual securities.

6 The Institute does not have a position on whether NASDR’s proposal is necessary or appropriate for broker-dealers and their associated persons. Even if it is, however, different considerations apply to portfolio managers.

Company Act, which places restrictions on the personal investment activities of investment advisory personnel.

For these reasons, the Institute believes that NASDR should not seek to regulate the activities of portfolio managers under this proposal. If, however, NASDR determines that such persons should be subject to the proposal, it should, in recognition of the clear differences in the degree of potential conflicts of interest, revise the proposed disclosure requirements as they would apply to such individuals to reflect these differences. In particular, NASDR should require the disclosure of financial interests in a recommended security held in a discretionary account managed by an associated person only when those financial interests comprise over five percent of the account’s portfolio holdings, rather than requiring disclosure of any such interest no matter how small. This change would appropriately limit the disclosure to those instances where the holdings might be viewed as significant enough to materially impact the fund’s or account’s performance.

In addition, NASDR should not require the disclosure of the specific funds and/or discretionary accounts managed by an associated person that have a financial interest in a recommended security, but instead should only require a general statement about the financial interest. For example, a portfolio manager should be permitted to state only that one (or more) of the discretionary accounts that he manages has a financial interest in the recommended security. If this were not the case, disclosure by portfolio managers could be quite lengthy and of little use if several funds managed by such persons hold the recommended security. It also could force the disclosure of confidential information.

II. **Scope and Use of the Term “Recommendation”**

The disclosure requirements under the proposal would be triggered whenever there is a “recommendation.” NASDR, however, has not defined the term “recommendation” for these purposes. The Institute believes that this term should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with how NASDR has defined it in the past, and strongly urges NASDR to clarify this prior to adoption of the proposal.

Specifically, NASDR should clarify that a favorable comment by a portfolio manager during a public appearance regarding a security that is part of his fund’s portfolio holdings would not be considered a “recommendation” of that security for purposes of the proposal. Such a statement would not, at least by itself, be designed to promote transactions by individual investors in the particular security.

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*In proposing the requirements for member firm disclosure of ownership of five percent or more of the total outstanding shares of any class of securities of the recommended issuer, the NASD states that “the ownership threshold recognizes that an analyst or firm is less likely to be influenced in its recommendation where a firm has a relatively small stake in an issuer.” We believe the same principle should be applied to the required disclosure of discretionary account holdings.*

*Similarly, NASDR should clarify that an unfavorable comment in this type of situation would not be considered a “recommendation.”*
Interpreting the scope of the term “recommendation” in this manner would be consistent with previous NASDR guidance. In its recent Notice to Members on online suitability,” NASDR stated that the “facts and circumstances” test of whether a communication is a “recommendation” for purposes of the suitability rule requires an analysis of the content, context, and presentation of the particular communication and is an objective, rather than a subjective, inquiry. NASDR further stated that an important factor in this regard is whether – given its content, context, and manner of presentation – a particular communication reasonably would be viewed as a “call to action” or suggestion that the customer engage in a securities transaction. Clearly, under this analysis, a discussion by a portfolio manager of a security held in his fund’s portfolio would not, in and of itself, be considered a “call to action” for individual investors to effect a transaction in that particular security. Accordingly, NASDR should clarify that, for purposes of this proposal, the term “recommendation” will be interpreted consistent with past NASDR guidance and that it would not apply to any favorable comment by a portfolio manager during a public appearance regarding a security that is part of his fund’s portfolio holdings.

In addition, it is our understanding that NASDR has informally taken the position that disclosure of certain holdings of a mutual fund (or unit investment trust) in an advertisement or sales literature does not constitute a recommendation of those particular securities. We request clarification that NASDR will continue to take this position.

If, however, because of increased concerns in this area, NASDR intends the proposal to cover communications beyond those that have been traditionally considered recommendations (e.g., all favorable comments regarding a security), it is extremely important that NASDR revise the proposal and use a term other than “recommendation” to refer to those communications. Otherwise, there will be substantial confusion regarding the scope of other NASDR rules and guidance that employ that term. For example, it would be unclear whether the suitability determination required by NASD Rule 2310 in connection with any “recommendation” would now apply to a broader array of communications. We assume that NASDR does not intend such a result. (And, if it did, this should be the subject of a separate rule proposal.)

Accordingly, in order to avoid any confusion, if NASDR intends this proposal to apply to a broader range of communications, it should use a term other than “recommendation.” We note that NASDR, in recognition of the potential implications of broadening the meaning of the term “recommendation,” took a similar approach in the case of its rules relating to the opening of day-trading accounts.11 We believe the same consideration should be applied to the present proposal.

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10 NASD Notice to Members 01-23, Online Suitability, April 2001.

11 In that proposal, NASDR determined to use the term “promoting” rather than “recommending.” Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41875 (September 14, 1999), 64 FR 51165 (September 21, 1999).
III. Requested Clarifications

If the final rule does apply to portfolio managers, NASDR should clarify its application in the case of mutual funds or other discretionary accounts with more than one portfolio manager. Specifically, in the case of a multi-manager fund, a portfolio manager should only be required to disclose information pertaining to that portion of the fund over which he has discretion.

In addition, we recommend that the proposal be modified to expressly clarify that ownership of a recommended security through a mutual fund (or other investment company) by an individual covered by the rule does not constitute a “financial interest” in a security that would have to be disclosed under the rule. Requiring NASD members and associated persons to look through a mutual fund to determine if the fund holds a recommended security would result in significant difficulties in complying with the rule.

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We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposal. If you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact the undersigned at 202-326-5824 or Ari Burstein at 202-371-5408.

Sincerely,

Amy B.R. Lancellotta
Senior Counsel

cc: Paul F. Roye, Director
Robert E. Plaze, Associate Director
Division of Investment Management
Securities and Exchange Commission

Thomas M. Selman, Senior Vice President, Investment Companies/Corporate Financing
Joseph P. Savage, Counsel, Investment Companies Regulation
Philip Shaikun, Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel
NASD Regulation
April 18, 2002

Mr. Jonathan G. Katz  
Secretary  
Securities and Exchange Commission  
450 Fifth Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20549-0609  

Re: Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest (File Nos. SR-NASD-2002-21 and SR-NYSE-2002-09)

Dear Mr. Katz:

The Investment Company Institute\(^1\) appreciates the opportunity to comment on proposed rule changes filed by the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock Exchange\(^2\) to address research analyst conflicts of interest.\(^3\)

As we stated in our comment letter to the NASD on its proposal to amend NASD Rule 2210 to address analyst conflicts of interest, the Institute strongly opposes the application of new disclosure requirements to investment advisory personnel, in particular portfolio managers of mutual funds and other discretionary accounts.\(^4\) Our letter noted that there are many differences in the potential conflicts of interest presented by “sellside” analyst recommendations and statements made by portfolio managers.\(^5\) As such, at least in the great majority of cases, any potential conflicts of interest for portfolio managers would be greatly attenuated. In addition, advisory firms already have stringent procedures in place to address potential conflicts relating to the personal investment activities of portfolio managers.

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\(^1\) The Investment Company Institute is the national association of the American investment company industry. Its membership includes 9,024 open-end investment companies ("mutual funds"), 485 closed-end investment companies and 6 sponsors of unit investment trusts. Its mutual fund members have assets of about $6.920 trillion, accounting for approximately 95% of total industry assets, and over 88.6 million individual shareholders.


\(^3\) Our comments are limited to the effect of these proposals on investment advisory personnel. The Institute does not have a position on whether the proposed rule changes are necessary or appropriate for broker-dealers and their associated persons. Even if they are, however, different considerations apply to investment advisory personnel.

\(^4\) Letter from Amy B.R. Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute to Barbara Z. Sweeney, NASD Regulation, dated August 15, 2001. In particular, the NASD’s proposal would have imposed new disclosure requirements, which would have applied to “portfolio managers of investment companies and other discretionary accounts ... where these managers are also associated persons of an NASD member.” NASD Notice to Members 01-45 (July 2001).

\(^5\) For the sake of simplicity, references in our letter to the term “portfolio manager” also include any other investment advisory personnel.
We are therefore pleased that the Release specifically states that because most mutual fund portfolio managers are not principally responsible for the preparation of "research reports" as defined by the NASD’s proposed rule change, a mutual fund portfolio manager generally would not be deemed to be a "research analyst," even if the portfolio manager is an associated person of a member firm and discusses the mutual fund's portfolio holdings in a television interview. We believe that the exclusion of these communications is appropriate inasmuch as they do not present the types of concerns that the proposed rule change is designed to address. For this reason, and the reasons discussed above, we strongly support this aspect of the proposal.  

The Institute seeks clarification on two aspects of the proposal. First, in order to avoid any confusion, the Institute requests clarification that the definition of "research report" would not include a report or statement, prepared by an investment adviser discussing the performance of a mutual fund, that includes a description of specific portfolio holdings. Second, the proposal does not contain a definition of the term "affiliate" for purposes of the disclosure requirements relating to a member organization's ownership of securities. The Institute therefore requests clarification that these disclosure requirements would not include the holdings of fiduciary accounts (e.g., mutual funds) managed by a member firm or its affiliate. Requiring such disclosure would impose unnecessary compliance burdens as this information is not currently being generated and provided to the proposed disclosing party on a real-time basis as would be required under the proposal. In addition, requiring that information about these holdings be shared between affiliates could violate a firm's Chinese Wall procedures. Finally, these holdings do not raise the same conflicts that the proposal is designed to address.  

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We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposal. If you have any questions regarding our comments, please contact the undersigned at 202-326-5824 or Ari Burstein at 202-371-5408.

Sincerely,

Amy B.R. Lancellotta  
Senior Counsel  

* If it is determined that any new requirements for portfolio managers are necessary, we believe the proper context for these requirements is rulemaking by the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and/or the Investment Company Act of 1940.
cc:    Paul F. Roye, Director
       Robert E. Plaze, Associate Director
       Division of Investment Management
       Securities and Exchange Commission

       Thomas M. Selman, Senior Vice President, Investment Companies/Corporate Financing
       Joseph P. Savage, Counsel, Investment Companies Regulation
       NASD Regulation